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In an auction each party bids a certain amount and the one which bids the highest is the winner.
Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all pay
auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the most commonly studied all pay auction,
parties forfeit their entire bid, and this has been considered as a model for expenditure on political
campaigns. Here we consider a number of alternative forfeits which might be used as models for
different real-world competitions, such as preparing bids for defense or infrastructure contracts.
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1. INTRODUCTION
For thousands of years, auctions have been used as a method for selling objects and four main
types of auctions have gained prominence. The first type of auction is the English auction. In this
type of auction, the seller continually raises the price of the item until only one person is willing
to pay, and the item is sold at this price. A second type of auction is the Dutch auction. In this
auction, the seller sets an extremely high price and continually lowers it until a bidder is willing
to pay. A third type of auction is the first-price sealed-bid auction. In this type, bidders all bid
simultaneously and the bidder with the highest bid wins and pays that bid. A fourth type of auction
is the second-price sealed-bid auction, where bidders also bid simultaneously, and the bidder with
the highest bid wins but pays the second-highest bid. These four types of auctions have already
been analyzed extensively in the literature.
Although the four auctions previously described are the most popular ones, there are may other
variations. Of particular interest are the ‘war of attrition’ and all-pay auction, since in both of these,
the bidders who do not win must pay a forfeit. In the former, the winner pays the second-highest
bid, while in the latter the winner pays the highest bid. Notably, conflicts among animals [1] can be
represented by the war of attrition. On the other hand all-pay auctions have be used to model the
arms race [2] and war outcomes [3], also rent-seeking scenarios such as lobbying [4] or competition
with sunk investments [5].
In a seminal paper Milgrom and Weber [6], building on earlier work [7–11], demonstrated mathe-
matically the equivalence of a number of auction systems under certain assumptions and derived the
expected selling prices and optimal bidding strategies. Krishna and Morgan [12] expanded on these
results by calculating the bidder strategies for all-pay auctions and the war of attrition scenario.
There were also multiple other papers that subsequently analyzed different variants on all-pay auc-
tions such as the behavior of bidders in an all-pay auction with incomplete information [13–15].
Additionally, Che and Gale [16] studied the relationship between all-pay and first-price auctions.
2In the most commonly studied models of all pay auctions, parties forfeit their entire bid. An
important comparison to a real world situation where both parties pay the full cost of their bids but
only the winner profits is expenditure on political campaigns [17]. One can also explore variants in
which the non-winning bidders pay different amounts based on all of the bids. Possibilities which
we will discuss here include bidders paying a constant entrance fee, or paying a fraction of their bid.
These auctions are not as prominent in commercial settings but can be used as models for many
other systems, some of which we will highlight.
In this paper we first outline some relevant background in Section 2 and then proceed to extend
the results of Krishna and Morgan [12] to all-pay auctions with different forfeits for the losing
bidders. In Section 3 we examine auctions with an entrance fee in addition to paying the bid, both
when the fee is returned to the winner and when it is not. Section 4 explores the case in which the
forfeit function is a constant fraction of the original bid. For these auctions, we derive an expression
for the symmetric bidding strategy in each case. Then between these types of auctions, we compare
the revenue made for the seller. In Section 5 we consider the approximate behavior of bidders with
an exponential forfeit as the bid grows larger. Section 6 provides a summary and a discussion of
possible future research directions.
2. BACKGROUND: ALL-PAY AUCTIONS
An independent private values model is an auction in which bidders are risk-neutral and only
know the value of the object to himself, with values taken from a continuous distribution. Milgrom
and Weber [6] developed such a model applicable to any symmetric auction, which we outline below.
Suppose there are n bidders all competing for a single object. Each bidder has their own in-
formation about the object, it is standard to define X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) where the components
represent the information known by each bidder i. Also introduce S = (S1, S2, . . . Sm) which repre-
sents additional variables that affect the value of the object but are only known to the seller. Then
suppose that there is a nonnegative finite function u such that u(S,Xi, {Xj}j 6=i) = Vi, giving the
value of the object to bidder i. The payoff for the winner is Vi − b where b is the price paid.
Furthermore, denote by f(S,X1, · · · , Xn) the joint probability distribution of the random vari-
ables, which is symmetric in the last n variables. Note that this function f obeys the ‘affiliation
inequality’ [18] given by f(z∨ z′)f(z∧ z′) ≥ f(z)f(z′) where z∨ z′ is the component-wise maximum
and z ∧ z′ is the component-wise minimum. This implies that it is more likely for the variables to
be close to each other, rather than farther apart. Then define Y1 = max{Xj}j 6=1 and let fY1(·|x) be
the conditional density of Y1 with x = X1. We denote the corresponding cumulative distribution as
FY1(·|x). Note the cumulative distribution of a function f at a point y is defined as the probability
that the result is at most f(y) and can be expressed as
FY1(y|x) =
∫ y
−∞
fY1(s|x)ds.
Moreover, the following Lemma, due to Milgrom and Weber [6], will be useful going forward
Lemma 1 (MW).
FY1 (x|z)
fY1 (x|z)
is non-increasing in z.
Proof. By the affiliation inequality, for α ≤ x and z′ ≤ z,
fY1(α|z)fY1(x|z
′) ≤ fY1(α|z
′)fY1(x|z) =⇒
fY1(α|z)
fY1(x|z)
≤
fY1(α|z
′)
fY1(x|z
′)
.
3Integrating both sides with respect to α from −∞ to x gives
FY1(x|z)
fY1(x|z)
≤
FY1(x|z
′)
fY1(x|z
′)
.
The above model has been used to study both first-price auctions [6] and all-pay auctions [12]
and will also be the focus of this work. In the classic all-pay auction in which the losers forfeit their
bid, one can define a payoff function W of the following form [12]
Wi =


Vi − bi bi > maxj 6=ibj
−bi bi < maxj 6=ibj
Vi
#{k:bk=bi}
− bi bi = maxj 6=ibj
.
Below we will outline the heuristic for finding the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy from [12].
Suppose bidders j 6= 1 follow the symmetric, increasing equilibrium strategy α and bidder 1 bids b
with X1 = x. Denote by v the expected value E[·] of the object to bidder 1, defined by
v(x, y) = E[V1|X1 = x, Y1 = y].
Then the expected payoff of bidder 1, denoted Π(b, x), is given by
Π(b, x) =
∫ α−1(b)
−∞
v(x, y)fY1(y|x)dy − b.
We can obtain the maximum payoff for bidder 1 with respect to the bid by finding when the
derivative with respect to b vanishes, which implies
v(x, α−1(b))fY1(α
−1(b)|x)
1
α′(α−1(b))
− 1 = 0.
At symmetric equilibrium, bidder 1 also follows the bidding strategy α, so α(x) = b, which gives
α′(x) = v(x, x)fY1 (x|x). (1)
Integrating this equation one obtains that the symmetric equilibrium has the following form
α(x) =
∫ x
−∞
v(t, t)fY1(t|t)dt.
However, this is only a necessary condition for the bidding strategy to be a symmetric equilibrium.
In [12] Krishna & Morgan the following theorem is proved which establishes the above as the
symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy for bidders in an all-pay auction:
Theorem 1 (KM). Let ψ(x, y) = v(x, y)fY1(y|x). If ψ(x, y) is increasing in x, then the formula
for symmetric equilibrium function is given by
α(x) =
∫ x
−∞
v(t, t)fY1(t|t)dt.
4Furthermore, Milgrom & Weber [6] showed that the symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy in a
first-price auction obeys a similar statement:
Theorem 2 (MW). The function of symmetric equilibrium for a first-price auction is given by
α(x) =
∫ x
−∞
v(s, s)
fY1(s|s)
FY1(s|s)
exp
(∫ s
x
fY1(t|t)
FY1(t|t)
dt
)
ds.
Additionally, from the above theorems Krishna & Morgan [12] proved that if ψ(x, y) is increasing
in x, then the expected revenue from an all-pay auction is at least as great as that from a first-price
auction. These results are important to sellers since they can help them determine what type of
auction they should use and how much they should expect to receive. In the remainder of this work
we will explore how the symmetric equilibria α(x) of all pay auctions are impacted by changes to the
forfeits that the losing bidders are required to pay by studying changes to the forfeit function W .
3. AUCTIONS WITH CONSTANT ENTRANCE FEES
In this section, we will investigate the effects of introducing a constant entrance fee to an all-pay
auction, a possibility remarked in passing in [12] but not analyzed further. First, we will examine
when the winner does not have their entrance fee returned, following which we consider the converse
case in which the winner alone receives their entrance fee back.
Suppose that a fee c is required to enter the auction, in the case that entrance fee is not returned
to the winner the expected payoff can be expressed as follows
Wi =


Vi − bi − c bi > maxj 6=ibj
−bi − c bi < maxj 6=ibj
Vi
#{k:bk=bi}
− bi − c bi = maxj 6=ibj
.
Adapting earlier arguments, we now derive a heuristic for the bidding strategy with this new form
of W . Suppose bidders j 6= 1 follow symmetric increasing equilibrium strategy α. The expected
payoff of bidder 1 making a bid b (and writing X1 = x) is given by
Π(b, x) =
∫ α−1(b)
−∞
v(x, y)fY1(y|x)dy − b− c.
To understand this form of the payoff note that the integral represents the expected value of the
object when bidder 1 wins and the other terms correspond to the amount bidder 1 pays, depending
on whether or not they won the auction.
To proceed we maximize the payoff function, similar to previously, thus we set the derivative with
respect to b to zero to obtain the condition
v(x, α−1(b))fY1(α
−1(b)|x)
1
α′(α−1(b))
− 1 = 0.
Interestingly, this equation does not depend on c at all, which means that the addition of a constant
entrance fee to an all-pay auction does not affect the strategy if the entrance fee is paid by everyone.
5Next we consider the converse case in which the entrance fee is returned to the winning bidder
(as might be a model for certain gambling scenarios). In this case the expected payoff is given by
Wi =


Vi − bi bi > maxj 6=ibj
−bi − c bi < maxj 6=ibj
Vi
#{k:bk=bi}
− bi bi = maxj 6=ibj
.
Suppose bidders j 6= 1 follow symmetric increasing equilibrium strategy α. The expected payoff of
bidder 1 making a bid b can be expressed as follows
Π(b, x) =
∫ α−1(b)
−∞
v(x, y)fY1(y|x)dy − b− c(1− FY1(α
−1(b)|x)),
and thus the payoff is maximized for
v(x, α−1(b))fY1(α
−1(b)|x)
1
α′(α−1(b))
− 1 + c · fY1(α
−1(b)|x)
1
α′(α−1(b))
= 0.
Similar to the derivation of eq. (1), bidder 1 follows the strategy α(x) = b, thus one has that
α′(x) = (v(x, x) + c)fY1(x|x) .
Integrating yields the equilibrium strategy
α(x) =
∫ x
−∞
(v(t, t) + c)fY1(t|t)dt =
∫ x
−∞
v(t, t)fY1(t|t)dt+ c
∫ x
−∞
fY1(t|t)dt.
This implies that when the entrance fee is returned to the winner, the bidding strategy changes.
This occurs because there is no longer symmetry in the forfeits. Notably, it can be observed that
without this symmetry the optimal bid amount increases as the entrance fee is raised.
4. AUCTIONS WITH FRACTIONAL FORFEITS
We next analyze the effects of having the forfeit be a fraction β ∈ (0, 1) of each parties bid,
therefore
Wi =


Vi − bi bi > maxj 6=ibj
−βbi bi < maxj 6=ibj
Vi
#{k:bk=bi}
− bi bi = maxj 6=ibj
.
Again suppose bidders j 6= 1 follow the symmetric increasing equilibrium strategy α, then the
expected payoff of bidder 1 is
Π(b, x) =
∫ α−1(b)
−∞
v(x, y)fY1(y|x)dy − bFY1(α
−1(b)|x)− (βb)(1− FY1(α
−1(b)|x)). (2)
It follows that the bid b that maximizes eq. (2) satisfies the following condition
v(x, α−1(b))fY1(α
−1(b)|x)
1
α′(α−1(b))
− FY1(α
−1(b)|x)− bfY1(α
−1(b)|x)
1
α′(α−1(b))
− β(1 − FY1(α
−1(b)|x)) + (βb) · fY1(α
−1(b)|x)
1
α′(α−1(b))
= 0.
6Multiplying both sides of the above equation by α′(α−1(b)) then taking α(x) = b gives
βα′(x) + (1− β)α′(x)FY1 (x|x) + (1 − β)α(x)fY1 (x|x) = v(x, x)fY1 (x|x). (3)
Observe that the above is a first order differential equation in α(x). Solving this equation, we obtain
α(x) =
∫ x
−∞
v(s, s)
dL(s, x)
1− β
,
where
L(s, x) = exp
(
(1− β)
∫ s
x
fY1(t|t)
β + (1 − β)FY1(t|t)
dt
)
.
Moreover, this can then be rewritten as follows
α(x) =
∫ x
−∞
v(s, s)
fY1(s|s)
β + (1− β)FY1 (s|s)
exp
(
−(1− β)
∫ x
s
fY1(t|t)
β + (1− β)FY1 (t|t)
dt
)
ds. (4)
It is interesting that for β = 0 we obtain the strategy for first-price auctions [6] and taking β = 1
yields the strategy for the classic all-pay auction in [12].
Theorem 3. When α(x) is as defined in eq. (4), it is a symmetric equilibrium.
Proof. Let t(x) = v(x, x), then by integration by parts α(x) can be rewritten as
α(x) =
v(x, x) −
∫ x
−∞
L(s, x)dt(s)
1− β
.
We adapt an argument in [6]1 in which it was observed that L(α|x) is decreasing in x and v(x, x)
is increasing, so α(x) will grow with increasing x. First suppose α(x) is continuous, then we can
assume α(x) is differentiable without loss of generality by monotonically rescaling bidder estimates.
To show that α(x) is the optimal bid, we find the maximum of the payoff function
∂
∂b
Π(α(z), x) =
fY1(z|x)
α′(z)
(
v(x, z)− (1− β)α(z) − α′(z)
(1− β)FY1(z|x)
fY1(z|x)
)
− β.
Applying Lemma 1 and the fact that v(x, z) is increasing it follows that ∂
∂b
Π(α(z), x) has the same
sign as z − x, this implies that Π(α(z), x) is maximized for z = x.
It remains to check cases in which α is discontinuous at some point x. In this case for any positive
ǫ, the following expression is infinite∫ x+ǫ
x
(1− β)fY1(s|s)
β + (1− β)FY1 (s|s)
∼ ∞.
It then follows that∫ x+ǫ
x
(1− β)fY1(s|s)
β + (1− β)FY1 (s|s)
≤
∫ x+ǫ
x
fY1(s|s)
βFY1(s|s) + (1− β)FY1 (s|s)
=
∫ x+ǫ
x
fY1(s|s)
FY1(s|s)
≤
∫ x+ǫ
x
fY1(s|x+ ǫ)
FY1(s|x+ ǫ)
= ln(FY1(x+ ǫ|x+ ǫ))− ln(FY1(x|x + ǫ)).
1 Specifically, Theorem 14 of [6] which studied a case corresponding to the β = 0 case of our generalized set-up.
7For the last expression to be infinite, it is required that FY1(x|x+ǫ) = 0, which is a statement proved
in Theorem 14 of [6]. Therefore, α(x) as given in eq. (4) is an equilibrium for this auction.
Theorem 4. The expected revenue generated for the seller of an all-pay auction with fractional cost
is always less than when β = 1 if f(y|x) is increasing in x.
Proof. Let αβ(x) be the equilibrium bid for a specific value of β. Notice that the expected payment
of a bidder is
eβ(x) = (FY1 (x|x) + β(1− FY1(x|x)))αβ(x)
=
∫ x
−∞
v(s, s)fY1(s|s)
β + (1− β)FY1(x|x)
β + (1− β)FY1 (s|s)
exp
(
−
∫ s
x
(1− β)fY1(t|t)
β + (1− β)FY1 (t|t)
dt
)
ds.
Since fY1(y|x) is increasing in x, it follows that β/fY1(y|x) is decreasing in x. Combined with
Lemma 1, this implies that
fY1 (y|x)
β+(1−β)FY1(y|x)
is increasing in x and therefore
−
∫ x
s
(1− β)fY1(t|t)
β + (1− β)FY1 (t|t)
dt ≤ −
∫ x
s
(1− β)fY1(t|s)
β + (1 − β)FY1(t|s)
dt
= ln(β + (1− β)FY1 (s|s))− ln(β + (1− β)FY1 (x|s))
≤ ln(β + (1− β)FY1 (s|s))− ln(β + (1− β)FY1 (x|x)) ,
where the last inequality comes from the fact that FY1(y|x) is non-increasing in x. It follows that
eβ(x) ≤
∫ x
−∞
v(s, s)fY1(s|s)
β + (1− β)FY1 (x|x)
β + (1 − β)FY1(s|s)
exp
(
ln
(
β + (1 − β)FY1(s|s)
β + (1− β)FY1 (x|x)
))
≤
∫ x
−∞
v(s, s)fY1(s|s) = e1(x).
Notably, this shows that the expected amount paid by a bidder in an auction where β ≤ 1 is at
most the expected price paid by a bidder in the original all-pay auction. Since this holds for each
bidder, it follows for the expected revenue earned by the seller as well.
To summarize, in this section we have proved the equilibrium bidding strategy for the all-pay
auction with fractional forfeit. We also showed that each of these auctions does not generate as
much revenue as the all-pay auction with complete bid forfeit. However, an ordering between two
auctions with different values of β is yet to be determined.
5. AUCTIONS WITH EXPONENTIAL FORFEITS
We next consider the interesting case in which the losers must pay an exponentially large forfeit,
as described by the following expected payoff function
Wi =


Vi − bi bi > maxj 6=ibj
−ebi bi < maxj 6=ibj
Vi
#{k:bk=bi}
− bi bi = maxj 6=ibj
.
8Suppose bidders j 6= 1 follow symmetric increasing equilibrium strategy α, then the expected payoff
of bidder 1 with bid b is
Π(b, x) =
∫ α−1(b)
−∞
v(x, y)fY1(y|x)dy − bFY1(α
−1(b)|x)− eb(1 − FY1(α
−1(b)|x)).
The bid that maximizes the payoff, is given by the critical point with respect to b, given by
v(x, α−1(b))fY1(α
−1(b)|x)
1
α′(α−1(b))
− FY1(α
−1(b)|x) − bfY1(α
−1(b)|x)
1
α′(α−1(b))
− eb(1− FY1(α
−1(b)|x)) + eb · fY1(α
−1(b)|x)
1
α′(α−1(b))
= 0.
Multiplying both sides of the above equation by α′(α−1(b)) and evaluating for α(x) = b gives
eα(x)α′(x) + (1 − eα(x))α′(x)FY1 (x|x) + (α(x) − e
α(x))fY1(x|x) = v(x, x)fY1(x|x),
which we rearrange to find an expression for α′
α′(x) =
(v(x, x) + eα(x) − α(x))fY1 (x|x)
eα(x) + (1 − eα(x))FY1(x|x)
.
The differential equation which arises cannot be solved analytically. However, for large bids one
may consider the approximate behavior for in the large b limit, which implies that
α′(x) ≈
fY1(x|x)
1− FY1(x|x)
.
It follows that the equilibrium strategy in this limit is given by
α(x) ≈
∫ x
−∞
dt
(
fY1(t|t)
1− FY1(t|t)
)
.
Interestingly, observe that this is independent of the function v, which represents the expected value
of the object to bidder 1.
As an explicit example, consider the case of two bidders where we denote bidder 1’s signal by x
and bidder 2’s signal by y, and suppose
f(x, y) =
4
5
(1 + xy),
where f is defined on [0, 1]× [0, 1]. This implies that fY1(y|x) =
2+2xy
2+x and FY1(y|x) =
2y+xy2
2+x , thus
α(x) =
∫ x
0
(
2 + 2t2
2− t− t3
)
dt =
∫ x
0
(
1
1− t
−
t
2 + t+ t2
)
dt.
This function behaves very similarly to − ln(1−x) since the second term in the integral is negligible.
Notice that this function increases slowly at first but then begins to grow increasingly rapidly. This
is indicative of the optimal strategy for successful parties in auctions with exponential forfeits,
specifically, that likely winners are those that bid significantly more than the typical bidder.
96. SUMMARY
In this work we have investigated the impact of changing the forfeit function in all pay auctions.
We highlighted that the addition of a constant entrance fee does not affect the bidding strategy
unless the fee is returned to the winner. When the forfeit is instead a fraction of the bid, we showed
that the revenue generated by the seller is increasing with the fraction. Lastly, when the forfeit
is exponential, the bidding strategy quickly approaches infinity and it was argued that successful
bidders will be those that bid significantly more than the typical bid.
It would be interesting to consider all-pay auctions with a wider range of forfeit functions, such
as logarithmic, polynomial, or constant functions. Likely this is most readily implemented by
considering fractional forfeits for all parties with the forfeit value differing depending on the ranking
of each parties bid, with the forfeits following a specified distribution. One might also explore the
difference in results if the bidders are risk-averse rather than risk-neutral, or the effects of multiple
prizes on the results, generalizing [19] to different forfeit functions. These forms of auctions all exist
in the real world, thus it is important to work towards fully understanding them.
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